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Abstract
I propose to engage in a survey and critical evaluation of various fundamental understandings of
selfhood. I will organize my analysis along two ontological dimensions. The first considers the
difference between individualist and communalist understandings of the self. The second
considers the difference between essentialist and non-essentialist (or socially constructed)
understandings of the self. My intention is to argue for a view that is conducive to human
flourishing by providing greater understanding of the self in relation to certain aspects of one’s
existence through which one can create meaning, and live a life directed towards the good as an
individual and a member of a community.
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Introduction
The self is a common reference point in every day conversation. But what does it truly mean
to be a self? When one refers to a personal taste, is that inherent to the individual, or is it
determined by the culture and society in which that person is situated? Even more importantly,
what about a moral reaction? Is a person’s ethic embedded in them by virtue of their humanity,
or dependent on their social context? And then there is the ever present question of the meaning
of life. The reality is that selfhood plays a role in how we as human beings conceptualize all of
these questions. The self lies at the core of our concept of our own humanity; without selfhood
we would likely not ascribe any meaning to ourselves or others. Yet we do, and this is because
people conceive of other people as individual selves, all with individual meanings and individual
value.
But the question remains as to how this self can be defined. Over thousands of years,
different philosophers, psychologists, scientists and other thinkers have all proposed different
ideas of what comprises the self, in an attempt to define, more exactly, how human beings make
meaning in the world, and how they can achieve some sort of good.
Of the theories that have been advanced, the great majority of them fall into two broad
schools of thought; the essentialist school which holds that there is something inherent about the
individual human that can be defined as a self, and those who hold that the self is socially
constructed and entirely dependent on the context in which it exists. In conjunction with these
two schools of thought are theories concerning whether the self exists as an individual or as part
of a greater communal whole. I will set about exploring various conceptions of the self as they
have been held to exist upon these two spectrums, wavering between each end.
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This paper will be an exploration of various theories of the self that have been presented and
are still regarded as valid today, as they fall into these categories. I will then argue for a more
precise view that is conducive to human flourishing by providing greater understanding of the
self in relation to the a greater awareness of how one can create meaning, and live a life directed
towards the good as an individual and a member of a community. Aiding me in this aim will be
an overview of new neuroethical findings, and some arguments regarding theory of mind
research from a neurobiological standpoint.
At this point, it will be necessary to flesh out the debate surrounding the concept of selves as
it has been developed today. The question most often presented is that of what, exactly,
constitutes a “self.” For many people believe that they are something distinct and individual,
over and above merely their bodies. They feel this, almost reflexively, in the easy way in which
they refer to an “I,” as in, “I feel this way,” or “I desire this thing,” as opposed to “my body feels
this way” and so forth. But the question remains. Many would, if pressed, refer to their mind as
the seat of this self. As for the seat of the mind, many would argue that it is the brain. But this
then leads to the question of whether the brain encompasses the whole of the mind, or if the mind
(the self) exists in some form beyond that. And if that is the case, that is, if the mind exists as
somewhat independent of the brain and body, how does the body influence it, if at all? Is the self
so distinct that it exists as an unextended substance, or does it require a body (or at least a brain)
to take any meaningful shape? The first argument is one that has been made by some
theologians, for whom the self would be called the soul.
Indeed, this was Plato’s original conception of the soul; he likened this rational, thinking soul
to the captain of a ship. But Plato also argued for the existence of a second, animalistic soul.
The first was immortal and could reincarnate into new bodies; the second died with each body.
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So would Plato be able to logically argue that the self is contained within this rational soul, and
is immortal? Well, maybe. The fact of the matter is, Plato did not write much on personal
individuality. So if we are to consider here that the self must also be an individual, then we must
also consider whether individuation in any meaningful way occurred in the rational soul, or if it
only arose out of combination with a body and the secondary vegetative soul. Similar themes
will be found in other conceptions of the soul as well.
For our modern purposes, the talk of souls might seem a tad out of scope1. However, the
general concepts, questions and arguments are still quite relevant. In the past few decades, the
debate has taken on a new name; the mind-brain (or mind-body) debate. While revitalized with
the advent of neuroscience and consciousness studies, the discussion of how selves, souls, or
minds relate to human bodies and the world in which they exist is nothing new. How much an
individual is shaped by and/or dependent on his or her body, to what degree participation by that
body in a society affects the individual, and what that means are questions for which the
ontologies introduced above have postulated answers. In short, this will be an attempt to
consolidate and continue a great and lengthy conversation on consciousness, personal identity,
the soul, and how they inform the self as significant markers of meaning in human society.
As we proceed, a number of secondary, but extremely relevant concepts will come to the fore.
Among these will be consciousness, intentionality and personal identity. Now, each of these
could warrant significant discussion on their own merits, but here we must consider them in the
context in which they are presented and evaluate their efficacy in supporting the stated end. So
for example, rather than debating the existence or nature of consciousness itself, we will examine
how the idea of consciousness, as presented by a certain theory, functions within that theory and

1

Although, there are a number of modern philosophies that rely on the notion of the existence of a soul in presenting
their various arguments and criticisms. These will be discussed at greater length later on.
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then evaluate the validity of the argument, evidence or concept on those grounds. This, I believe,
will facilitate a greater ease of conversation across these ontological dimensions.
Now, one might well ask if this investigation has any importance aside from pure intellectual
curiosity. Does it really matter how we are, especially if how we see ourselves may, in large
part, remain generally unchanged? And my argument is that yes, it matters a great deal. The
implications for a more correct understanding of the self reach beyond the personal and into the
social and political realms. If we are built, constructed or exist in a certain way then the nature
of our interactions can have profound effects on who we are as human beings, and how we
pursue meaningful lives, even to the level at which we define “meaningful.” If, for example, we
are more communally constructed than essentially individual, then a liberal individualist society
might not be conducive to what the ancients called eudaimonia, the human flourishing that is the
goal of any good life. Indeed, it may even be harmful. And so, while how one person views
himself introspectively might not change all that much, notions of interaction can change policy
and social structure in a way that is more conducive to meaning-making and good lives.
But to avoid getting too far ahead of ourselves with these political theory arguments, we will
begin with a critical survey of the underlying philosophical concepts that further theories assume
to be true. I will begin with a discussion of various soul-types, arguing in favor of a dual-aspect
monist view of the soul as self. I will follow with an examination of various physicalist
conceptions of selfhood, in overall support of the non-reductive physicalist view as the most
correct. Following that will be an examination of the necessary ontologies of selves presupposed
by four major strains of political and social theory, favoring certain aspects of each. In
compliment to this, a discussion of genealogical and contingent selfhood will follow,
problematizing certain assumptions of the preceding political theories, while revealing inherent
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discrepancies within those modes of thought. My conclusion will seek to consolidate the dual
aspect monist viewpoint with the non-reductive physicalist conception of the individual, while
situating that subject in a framework most closely favoring communitarian ideals, with
concessions to the genealogical perspective.
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The Essential-Individual Self
There are two classes of thought when it comes to conception of the self 2 as an essential
entity. The first is known most commonly known under the broad category of the “physicalist”
class, though it has been given other names, such as “determinist.” The major belief here is that
human beings are collections of nerves and neurons, firing in response to stimuli, and that all
human events, including mental events, have physical origins. The other class of thought has no
widely used title. However, these soulophiles are generally see humans as ensouled beings, in a
manner of speaking, with an essential nature that is nonetheless, in some way mediated by its
interaction with the physical body. These two viewpoints tend to be mutually incompatible, for
the reasons of fundamental assumptions and beliefs they hold. However, in considering the two
of them together, ideas concerning personal identity and consciousness, both of which are
generally associated with the self, can be made more apparent, and given more thorough
analysis.
The Soul
Let us begin with the soul. As a general concept, the soul is quite ancient. Homer referenced
the soul, though somewhat vaguely, while Plato and Aristotle presented more advanced theories
of the soul and its faculties. Our modern conceptions of the soul tend to be different in some key
respects, especially from a historically Judeo-Christian perspective. But these remain
conceptions influenced by the language of ancient thinkers. The following discussion will not be
an attempt at proof or denial of the existence of a human soul, but rather, a discussion of the
ontological assumptions necessitated by a belief in the soul as the essential self.

2

At times throughout, due to the somewhat ethereal nature of the subject, I will use self and identity
interchangeably, though if a distinction is necessary between the two, I will endeavor to qualify and clarify it.
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As far as the soul is concerned, there are two distinct conceptions regarding its function and
placement within the realm of human existence, and how it exists as the self. These two camps
are the substance dualists, and the dual aspect monists. I will divide the substance dualists into
two further categories: the Platonic and the Cartesian. Before discussing the differences, some
commonalities between these two dualistic visions will be elucidated. Firstly, the dualist belief
in a soul generally regards it as a motivating principle of the being which contains it. 3 Arriving
neatly at our next point, the soul is believed to, at times, reside within a physical system of some
sort which gives rise to a complete being (i.e. soul+body=human being). Within this
relationship, the soul is generally seen as providing something to the being which the physical
system does not and could not possess on its own. Furthermore, the physical system is believed
to have some effect on the condition of soul, which can have consequences to varying degrees.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the soul is generally believed to be immortal in some
fashion.
The Platonic soul gained its greatest foundation from its namesake, Plato, through a series of
dialogues, most notable the Republic, the Phaedrus and the Phaedo. Plato described a soul that
encompassed the greater part of human psychology, essentially encompassing most of what is
assumed to make us human. His tripartite soul was composed of a rational part, a spirited part,
and an appetitive part.4 Each part corresponded with a particular drive; spirit was responsible for
anger and courage, appetite supplied desire and the rational was (ideally) in charge of everything.
Yet these parts were generally in contention with one another, especially as the rational part

3

This may be a better understanding of the Aristotelian soul; as a sort of “life force” rather than an eternal being on
its own terms.
4
Raymond Martin and John Barresi, The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self. New York, NY: Columbia University Press,
2006.
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(nous in Greek5) warred with the appetitive part. Plato left the soul so divided because it allowed
him to explain the curious occurrence of competing desires in what appeared to be a unified
being, claiming that it is not “possible for the same thing to stand still and move at the same time
in the same part of itself.”6 This theory necessitates that the soul, as Plato sees it, be an object in
a certain sense. Plato continually held that the soul was an immaterial thing, simple (without
parts7) and unextended. 8 These three things preserve it from physical deterioration and therefore
allow its immortality. At the cost of greater detail, I think it best to sum up the Platonic soul in
the following terms: i) it is immaterial; ii) it is immortal; iii) it participates in some part of the
divine; and most importantly, iv) it governs the important aspects of human existence (reason,
agency etc.). A final note that is worth mentioning is that Plato developed more fully the idea
that the soul had a post-mortem fate that was determined largely by its activity on earth. He
developed this into a greater theory of knowledge and reincarnation. However, its greatest
importance lies in its legacy. This was the first time that the soul was imbued with what we
might today call consciousness. This was very closely tied into ideas of meaningful human lives,
agency, and immortality.
Much space has been given to Plato’s description of the soul because I believe it gives proper
ground for understanding ways in which the problems inherent in belief in an immortal soul were
dealt with by future thinkers. Namely, there is some supraphysical essence within a human
being that contains, shapes, and defines what that person essentially is. Plato likened the soul to
the captain of a ship (the body), insofar as the soul was the controlling and meaningful aspect of
5

I will use this term throughout this section when I need to refer to the rational aspect of human personality,
regardless of its theoretical origin.
6
Pl. Rep. 436c
7
This may seem at odds with the previous assertion that the Platonic soul has three parts. However, I believe the
rational, spirited and appetitive parts are best thought of as faculties as opposed to actual physical parts. In any case,
as Plato’s soul is an immaterial essence, its parts would not function in similar fashion to physical objects.
8
Martin, Barresi
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the human being, while the body was more or less a containing (and constraining) vessel. 9 Yet
what the soul did with that body under its control affected it in a real way. This is generally the
simplest view of self as soul, or, later on, as mind.
This way of conceiving the self found an enormous champion in René Descartes who, while
in some respects similar to Plato, espoused an entirely nonphysical mind-soul entity that
comprised the entire essence of what a person is. This is the Cartesian soul, and I believe that it
is the closest to the lay belief held by so many people around the world today when it comes to
soul-hood, or lacking the assertion of a soul, self-hood. Descartes asserted that the ‘I’ is a “thing
which thinks…a think which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses,
which also imagines and feels.” 10 He further separated these activities from the body:
Is there likewise any one of these attributes which can be distinguished from my
thought, or which might be said to be separated from myself? For it is so evident
that it is I who doubts, who understands, and who desires, that there is no reason
here to add anything to explain it.11
Having previously shown an ability to doubt the existence of any physical attributes (i.e. body)
yet an eternal inability to deny that he exists as a thinking substance in which this doubt is
manifest, Descartes concludes that no part is played by the body in those activities listed above
which he took to be the defining aspects and activities of the human self, the most important of
which was the nous. And while his theories provided significant groundwork for modern
philosophy of self, his conclusions also contained within them some problems, which will be
discussed a bit later on.
For now, we will move on to the implications of the concept of self as soul (or eternal mind,
or spirit). The first consideration that must be made is a theological one, for religion generally

9

Martin and Barresi, Rise and Fall, 17.
Descartes, trans. Haldane. Works 153.
11
Ibid.
10
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prescribes itself as a way to cultivate care for the soul, with the presumption that the soul is an
eternal essence with a fate beyond bodily death. Due to this fact, ways of conducting oneself are
laid out by these religions so that, following “earthly death” one will achieve eternal reward, or
avoid eternal punishment, or be reincarnated into an equally good, if not greater station in the
next life. Because of this then, and if it is to be held true, the soul must make up for a number of
considerations.
Most obviously, the soul must have the ability to influence the body in a significant way. It
cannot be a mere passenger, nor can it have its domain reside entirely in mental activity. If this
were the case, duties of action would be comically useless, for the simple fact that there would
be no connection between soul and action. Secondly, the soul must contain at least a significant
portion of personal identity to justify reward or punishment. If the soul were something more
like Aristotle’s motivating psuche, then punishing it would make no sense, as the principle of
action (the unified self) had been dissolved upon bodily death.
This brings us then to two more considerations. Primarily is the degree to which this
ontology is dependent on the body. For if the human being as a whole is to be considered a soul
joined with a physical body, it must be further considered whether the body plays any role in
defining the self. For instance, many Mosaic traditions teach of a “resurrection of the body” or
“joining with new bodies” in the afterlife. 12 Such doctrine assumes that there is a significance to
the body, though it is largely silent on the degree of significance, which leaves room for endless
debate. On one hand, the Cartesian hand, the body is largely irrelevant, but if a body is required
for participation in eternal glory, then it Descartes would not allow it to be the same body, as he
holds the earthly human body to be imperfect, which would render it unworthy to participate in
the divine. However, if who we are is to any degree determined by our bodies, then being joined
12

Martin and Barresi, Rise and Fall, 55-75.
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with new and different bodies might very well make different people. Thus, the question arises:
is it moral to reward people who, though vastly similar to earthly individuals, are nevertheless
different entities on the whole? Similar questions can be asked of punishment: Is punishment
only for the soul? If so, then could that be considering punishment for a slightly different entity?
Is the body necessary for the punishment to be just? The same body?
These endless considerations are, at least in part, resolved in what I believe to be a slightly
more modern conception of the soul. The assertion developed here is that “the connection
between body and soul is not simply extrinsic…Rather, the human being is entirely body and
entirely soul.”13 In this way, the problematic insistence on substance dualism can be cleared
away, instead being replaced with what can be understood as an “aspective” account of the soul
wherein “each ‘part’…stands for the whole person, thought of from a certain angle.” 14 This
reformulation frames the human soul more as an activity than an entity in its own right. By this
understanding, the soul is the subjective aspect of a whole human being’s interaction with some
sort of divine essence or eternal reality. Pope emeritus Joseph Ratzinger described it in this way:
“What we call in substantialist language ‘having a soul’ will be described in a more historical,
actual language as ‘being God’s partner in a dialogue.’” 15 The immortality of the soul is ensured
by the immortality of the object of its participation and contemplation. This, and related ways of
considering the soul fall under the category of dual aspect monism, which posits a single
substance (human being) which nevertheless can be understood and experienced in different
ways. Thus, the soul becomes de-objectified, insofar as it is no longer considered to be
substance.

13

Casey, Thomas G.. "The Return of the Soul." Studies Irish Review 102. (2013); 34.
Nancey Murphy, “Do Humans Have Souls? Perspectives from Philosophy, Science and Religion,” Interpretation:
A Journal of Bible and Theology 67 (1) (2013); 33.
15
Casey, “Soul” 35.
14
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This theory of the soul meshes well with certain other, existentialist and transcendental
theories of experience and consciousness. “Kant’s idea of the transcendental ego expresses the
idea that the subject is a constitutive condition of objects of experience…and not a substance in
itself.”16 This transcendental ego, which is the subject of experience, can be understood as a
field within which experiences are had. In fact, this view asserts that such a subjective field is
necessary for any sort of objective knowledge. In other words, there is no fact at all without an
observer. It is important to note that this transcendental ego, this consciousness, this soul,
contains these objects of experience, but it is not composed by them. In fact, it can never be such
an object because it is “a dimension in which objects appear…No concrete content can be
attributed to the consciousness, since every concrete content is an object of consciousness and
not consciousness itself.” 17 According to this conceptualization then, and in keeping with dual
aspect monism, the soul is not something that can be experienced, but something in which
experiences are had. This offers some resolution to the problems of hard line dualism espoused
by the followers of Descartes18 in that it makes the ghost-in-the-machine into an aspect of the
machine itself. Indeed, such dual aspect monism allows for subjectively perceived duality within
human beings (the idea that one is more than just body) while at the same time being less
problematic for the advances of neuroscience that relate brain functions with human states.
While one might observe this, assume unidirectional causation and thus conclude that a
controlling and inducing soul (or mind) that is separate from the body would be redundant, the
“transcendental ego” allows for the reality of the subjective experience of brain states without
requiring dualistic and mysterious causation.
16

Frogel, Shai. "The Soul: An Existentialist Point of View." Human Studies 33: 193
Ibid, 197.
18
Clarke writes that such a dualist “would have to assume that the soul communicates differently with different
parts of the brain to explain why lesions or stimulation in different parts of the brain affect different aspects of
mentality with great specificity.” (63).
17
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One final consideration is that of identity and agency. Dual aspect monism, as I have
described it above can be supplemented with the understanding that it is not only a field within
which experience is had, but also where meaning is assigned to object and experience. This,
obviously, cannot occur in a vacuum; this field can be cultivated, so to speak. The meaning, and
thus the objective reality of an object of experience can be altered by a shift in the attitude of this
consciousness towards that object and affect a change in the human’s response to whatever its
object is. Simply put, this field houses existential choice wherein the approach of consciousness
is defined and decided. To what degree these choices are entirely free, favored by conditioning
and/or made available by conversation with the divine is still a matter of great debate.
Along the same thread, identity under this view of soul or mind is best understood as a
continuity of personality, resting largely in memory and association with both body and attitude.
It is not so essential as to be prepackaged within a self-contained soul unit, but it is essential in
the fact that a person identifies with the choices available to them, the objects of their perception
and the subjective perception of these objects in a continuous way (perhaps in an unchanging
field of existence). For now, we will move on to consider the implications of this particular
ontology, as a whole, bearing in thought that many of the arguments advanced here in favor of
soul can be applied to the mind to various degrees.
Now, most broadly, if the soul is a thing which exists (in any form) and it is believed to house
the self, then a meaningful life is one most lent to the cultivation of a good soul. Some may
consider this a religious life. Some may even extend it so far as to argue in favor of an ecclesial
society. While this may be a slight overreach, it bears in mind a certain type of structure. The
fact is, if humans are in fact embodied souls or minds that contain the essential aspects of
personhood, personality, and agency, then the best society would be one that makes individuals
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aware of the choices available to them and educates them in regards to the best choices to make,
and how to determine what the best choices are. The question of “best” is, of course, an endless
one. However, it can be narrowed by this particular ontology. For if humans are these selfcontained individuals, then the best choices will always be individual ones, because the question
will always be what is good for me, rather than what is good for society, or the community. The
idea being that good individuals making good choices will lead to a good overall society.
Returning briefly to the still heavily defended idea that the soul is a personal entity residing
within a body, there arise a host of ethical implications. The best example is on the abortion
front. If in fact humans are imbued with a soul that is the essence of what they are, then timeline
becomes a much more important consideration. If the soul is placed in the fetus at conception,
then it is a person at that very instant. If, however, it is a developed aspect of existence, then
perhaps full personhood can be denied even to infants. But if it is a simple aspect of human
existence, it becomes murkier in some regards. Can the dialogue with God referenced above be
unidirectional (God-to-baby) and still suffice for self- or soul-hood? Is the threshold for
personhood awareness or simply the potential for awareness (i.e. the potential mind)? This last
question is compounded when one is forced to consider whether the source of the subjective field
of experience is God, or the brain (or nervous system). This is especially important for
considerations of immortality. This is not meant to resolve this debate. It simply shows how,
given this particular understanding of a person, the self as the ethereal individual being, can
frame certain questions and emphasize certain aspects of human existence. Still, the dual aspect
monist formulation allows room for the soul without the problems inherent in Cartesian dualism,
such as the fact and manner of communication between body and soul. Beyond the soul, dual
aspect monism at least partly resolves the issue of how the actions of the body can affect the self,
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being non-identical as they are. Additionally, it fits in well with empirical realities revealed
through modern neuroscience.
The Brain
On the other side of the debate regarding an essential concept of the human self resides
physicalism. It can also be called materialism, determinism, and a myriad of other titles, but
most hold in common the belief that “it may…be true that each and every mental event has a (set
of) cause(s) sufficient to produce it.”19 However, even with this seemingly concise definition
there remains a large degree of uncertainty and disagreement over issues such as the degree of
acceptable reduction, and the implications of this assertion, which makes sense when one
considers that one’s understanding of the aforementioned belief can shift widely depending on
one’s definition of “cause” and “mental event.” The following will focus mostly on what one
author calls the “scientistic”20 definition of self, drawing largely (at times almost exclusively) on
the advancements of neuroscience, sociobiology and psychology. 21
The simplest position in this field falls under what I will call reductive physicalism. This
view is, in its most basic form, the assertion that everything is physical. This must be understood
to mean that all properties, events (even mental events) and occurrences supervene upon physical
events and properties. The most extreme end of this theory posits that each and every aspect of
reality, both the apparent and the invisible, are reducible to the laws of physics. “Everyone
agrees that everything obeys the laws of physics. Electrons, protons, quarks, muons, and gluons
appear in the laws of physics, but these things do not appear anywhere in the ‘laws’ of

19

Owen Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002, (60).
Ibid.
21
I will, for the time being, leave out certain other reductionist theories, such as those which posit the self to be a
linguistic fiction. These theories, while relevant to the discussion, hold a constructivist view of the self, which will
be discussed further on.
20
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psychology, sociology, anthropology or economics.” 22 The fact that these things exist, and are
inherently obedient to the laws of physics mean we can, given enough information, determine
exactly the results of interactions of these smaller particles. Furthermore, since these particles
make up everything in our world, from stars, to planets, to human beings, to trees, and bacteria it
makes logical sense that these things can be entirely understood and determined as well, as
everything is the necessary result of physical interactions. This theory expressly rejects the
existence of anything nonphysical including souls, selves and minds, and even as far as
psychological states. The reasoning is that psychological states are simply manifestations of
physical reactions within the brain and do not, as legitimate things, truly exist. Taken to its
logical conclusion, even greater systems such as society and culture are thus understood to be
determined by the interaction of these particles.
For a great many people, this view is very disturbing, and for obvious reasons. The first is the
total negation of any kind of will, or volition. If reductive physicalism is true, then there is no
reason to even suppose that human beings will to act. They simply act. The will is an illusory
concept that serves to reconcile an bodily occurrence (you lift your arm) with a mental event
(synapses fire to raise the arm) within the awareness of the subject. However, there is nothing
you could have done to prevent yourself from raising that arm at that point in time. In such a
view, consciousness is simply the result of objective awareness combined with a retentive
memory that is conducive to survival of the organism. In this case, the notion of free will may
simply be epiphenomenal.
However, this theory has a couple of major flaws. Insofar as it denies the existence of
anything physical, reductive physicalism would necessarily deny emergent properties resultant
from experience. For example, pain is not a physical thing; a needle will activate nerves in your
22

Flanagan, Soul, 216.
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shoulder that transmit electronic signals along your neck and into your brain, and the brain will
respond in kind, releasing chemicals and sending out its own signals, tensing the muscle area, or
even causing you to pull away, but none of that is pain. Pain is an subjective experience of these
events, but it is not directly reducible to them. Additionally, reductive physicalism ignores the
fact that, despite being irreducible to pure physics, such experiences are real things insofar as
they can be experienced and understood. A slightly less reductionistic view can be found in the
theory that “[o]ur conative, cognitive, and affective states, and the actions in which they issue,
can be fully accounted for by structural and functional features of the brain and its connections
with the rest of the central nervous system.” 23 This assertion falls short for similar reasons to
those listed above, as well as others that will be discussed below.
An alternate theory that will be further expounded upon below is what I will house under the
title non-reductive physicalism. 24 In this view, mental events may still very well supervene upon
the physical, but they are not wholly reducible to physics themselves. Here, then, selves are
better thought of as embodied and embedded concepts in their own right that nonetheless have
some physical grounding.
The first important aspect of selfhood in this regard is personal identity. Rather than being an
entity in and of itself, selfhood is best described as an emergent property of normal human
existence. Indeed, development of an autobiographical self concept is held by some as the
highest stage in developmental psychology. However, it necessarily rests on the existence of a
“proto-self” that is a simple and unconscious representation of the environment to the organism,

23

Walter Glannon, Brain, Body and Mind: Neuroethics with a Human Face. New York, NY: Oxford University
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and a “core self” which consists in a subjective awareness.

25

The narrative sense arises when

one can view oneself as a coherent, differentiated subject of experience with a past and a
(potential) future. This requires a degree of psychological continuity that is provided by a
combination of episodic memory and the ability to hold a concept in one’s mind for an extended
period of time.
This concept one holds as self is the view of oneself as the first-person subject of a unique
stream of conscious experience provided by an exclusive connection to one’s own nervous
system. The very fact that you are so connected to your own experience in a way that you are
not in terms of the experiences of others makes your own experiences much more concrete and
therefore solidifies your sense of self. This particular sense is not understood as something
actually concrete (though it is real), but rather as an indexical indicator; something to “situate
those aspects of oneself for oneself and others in order to engage in the projects of selfknowledge, self-explanation, self-prediction, and self control, and to assist others in so doing.”26
In this regard, we can see how the self might be an adaptive thing that satisfies an “organism’s
need to adapt to the surrounding natural and social context.”27
In properly circular fashion, this context then serves to influence the very self attempting to
adapt to it. The human organism is the subject of an essentially endless stream of experience,
“but selfhood is grounded in psychological connectedness, in the connections to experiences,
feelings, traits of character, and actions that we pick out of the complete continuous stream as
most important, as most identity constitutive.” 28 In some ways, these are conscious memories
that we acknowledge as formative, or beliefs we hold that guide our activities; the self in this
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sense is a sort of an abstraction that serves as a locus of identity in order to magnify the
significant aspects of our lives, providing a more concrete meaning. It is, in short, what gives
character to a particular narrative that would otherwise be simply a stream of experiences with
no affective significance whatsoever.29
But this process occurs at an unconscious level as well, perhaps to an even greater extent. For
example, during a moment of fear, the fight-or-flight response is triggered by the release of
adrenaline. “The release of adrenaline into the bloodstream also activates noradrenergic
mechanisms in the amygdala, which promote the formation, consolidation, and reconsolidation
of unconscious memories of fearful and other emotionally charged events.” 30 This contributes to
what some theorists have called the “fringe” of consciousness, an unconscious halo around the
stream of experience that gives it further meaning and significance. In many regards, this is a
good thing, as it provides a natural and unconscious source of a socially acceptable temperament
by virtue of the feedback loops that informed it. Unfortunately, it has a darker side as well:
“hypersecretion of adrenaline and noradrenaline in response to a traumatic event can consolidate
an unconscious memory of the event so strongly that it results in a pathological condition,” such
as that experienced by those under the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder.31
But the experiences of those undergoing PTSD do reveal at least one important thing. PTSD
is an affective disorder in that it is evidenced by a difference in behavior from a perceived norm,
at a conscious level. It indicates awareness of particular patterns of behavior that enables us to
recognize deviations from those patterns when we act “out of character.” This stable sense of
character is established by autobiographical memory (we can see how we were previously) and a
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psychological continuity of oneself as a continuous subject of experience, and internal and
external observation (both we and others can see how we are at present). Thus patterns, and
belief about oneself are formed which serve as the basis for self-evaluation, as well as a
foundation for appropriate action. There is significant evidence that conscious beliefs can have
real physiological effects on human beings, like the placebo effect, for example. The reduction
of any symptoms is entirely due to the conscious belief that the medicine will in fact aid in
symptom reduction. This belief stems from a larger integrated system of belief in regards to
medicine in general and the goal and purpose of physicians. 32 However, this indicates that
beliefs can and do affect the way we respond to the world, right down to the physical responses
we have to stimuli. Thus it is reasonable to believe that beliefs about oneself, reinforced by the
perceived and actual stability of one’s own character, will inform the responses that person will
have to the world around them.
Such psychological continuity may, in part, be reinforced by a relatively new discovery in
neuroscience: mirror neurons. Normally thought to play a role in empathy, mirror neurons fire in
response to a perceived action or emotional state creating a somewhat reduced parallel of the
observed state (i.e. I smile; you feel happy). Now, because psychological states are made sense
of through observation as children (as in the correlation between happy and smiling), as mature
organisms human beings we understand these states consciously in terms of observation. We, in
a sense, recall observing others expressing happiness through smiles (which activated parallel
circuits in our own brains) when we feel happy. Thus, while the abject feeling of happiness is a
thing of its own, we only are able to comprehend it from a perspective of observation in which
we posit ourselves as the subject of this observation. In other words one will “simply think at
[oneself] as the one that is attached to that body that will still be followed by the gaze of
32
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others.”33 One is one’s own object of observation and that concept becomes the self, as a
continuous psychological entity. This, of course, is still in the developing stages of its
formulation and will become understood as more or less formative with further testing.
One thing that is important to note is that, despite all the talk of awareness, belief and
subjectivity, there truly is a way in which we exist in the world. The self is intended as an
approximation of this way of being, though it is limited by our imperfect cognitive capacities. 34
This is not to say that the self is a fiction (though some would argue that), but simply that the self
is a concept that serves as a mediator between awareness and reality. The self concept is a tool
that either adjusts one’s behavior or itself in order to provide greater coherence between the
experience one has of oneself and the reality of the world around one, including the perceptions
and influence of peers. In summary, the self, when it is normal and healthy, is the realization
(and actualization) of the life one is really living.
Now, one could reasonably ask how, despite all the discussion of physical, hormonal and
structural processes that go into the formation of the self, I could have held, as I still do, that the
self is not purely housed within the brain, or central nervous system, or any combination of
mechanistic physical processes? The simple answer lies in intentionality. John Searle describes
intentionality and its related problems in this way:
[It is] the feature by which our mental states are directed at, or about, or refer to,
or are of objects and states of affairs in the world other that themselves.
‘Intentionality’…doesn’t just refer to intentions, but also to beliefs, desires, hopes,
fears, love hate, lust disgust, shame, pride, irritation, amusement and all of those
mental states…that refer to, or are about, the world apart from the mind. Now the
question about intentionality is…[h]ow can this stuff inside my head be about
anything. How can it refer to anything?...How, to put it crudely, can atoms in the
void represent anything?35

33

Gregory de Vleeschouwer, (65).
Flanagan, Soul, 244.
35
John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. (16)
34

25
Thus, mechanistic processes are insufficient for explanations of mental phenomena because they
ignore the very real fact that these phenomena are realized in biological, mental, and social
systems. Physical sources are not ignored, but must simply be recognized as simply a part
(however necessary) of a much larger process.
Which brings us to the second aspect of selfhood deemed relevant: conscious volition.
Despite all the discussion above, it may still seem reasonable to think that ‘free will’ as we have
conceived it may not really exist; or at most that it is epiphenomenal insofar as it is established
by reflective awareness on actions which one would have undertaken regardless. A series of
experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet seem to support this theory. In his tests, he noted that
a readiness potential appeared in the brain of test subjects a distinct amount of time before a
conscious awareness of the desire to move their wrists or fingers, which seemed to indicate an
unconscious source for seemingly volitional activity. 36 However, this need not be worrisome for
a number of reasons. Indeed, while free will itself might be a bit of a misnomer, there is no
reason to doubt agential causation.
Firstly, there is the very fact of the test itself. It was conducted in a very small, discrete
temporal setting and only examined that portion of time in which the readiness potential
apparently lead to action. This, however, ignores distal intention, which is a conscious aspect of
long-term planning which serves to inform appropriate action in accordance with that goal, even
from a subconscious level. Secondly, but in relation, this particular conclusion ignores the
necessarily historical component of any intention that is formed. In this way, reasons for action
“involve more than proximal urges in my brain. They also involve conscious beliefs whose
content reflects features of the external environment.”37 Decision is not discrete. It involves a
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myriad of influences which, even simply on the merits of physical external influences on
decision making, already show that there is more than the brain at play in terms of decisionmaking.
In addition, there is a faulty belief about the direction of causation. It rests on the assumption
that causal influence within the mind is linear when, in fact, modern neuroscience has shown this
is not the case at all. “The causal trajectories are best described as neither top-down nor bottom
up but circular.”38 The brain-mind interaction is an informational feedback loop. Beliefs inform
physiological responses which cause mental states which then reinforce or adjust beliefs and
intentions which then return a new series of physical inputs to the subconscious mind, including
those of beliefs altered by interaction with the external world. The mind is thus a self-priming
pump by virtue of its being in the world.
Finally, one must realize that a faulty argument is at play within the theories that deny
agential causation. Simply because mental states have physical causes does not mean that they
cannot be causes of further events. This belief in some ways actually runs counter to a great deal
of scientific assertions. In essence, the argument states that causes cannot have causes outside
themselves. This is a causa sui argument to which much of science is adamantly opposed. I
think it best to consider that physical events are necessary components for further action (Libet’s
readiness potential) but they are insufficient to bring it about without the proper mental event
(the decision to move). Both are necessary components, though one may depend in some
respects on the other. Now, the exact mechanism for choice is not well understood and I
certainly will not endeavor to resolve that issue here. Suffice it to say that, even if further
physical events have physical causes, the reason behind those physical events (the mental state)
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as triggers is relevant to the process as a whole. This is roughly the mechanism for agential
causation, allowing for conscious influence.
The scientific view, while unsettling for some, has had a good deal of positive effects in the
world already. For example, epileptics are no longer thought to be demon possessed; the
realization that abnormal brain functioning causes seizures enabled effective treatment. In like
fashion, the discovery of physical components to psychological disorders facilitates greater
understanding and more effective treatment. The danger in the reductionist mode of thought is in
the tendency to treat everyone simply as a brain in need of chemical correction, which totally
ignores the subjective aspects of experience and the intentionality of belief, both of which have
been shown to have physiological effects. 39 “Cognitive-behavioral therapy is just one example
of how some mental states can be causally efficacious in altering brain states and influencing
actions that issue from them. Reframing our beliefs about the world can have modulating effects
on cortical and even limbic regions of the brain.” 40 For one thing, this indicates that
pharmacological treatment of some mental disorders may not be expressly necessary, or
sufficient. But beyond the mentally disturbed, it indicates that, as much as our brains affect who
we are, who we are affects our brains. Intentionality is a conscious activity and it lends itself to a
moral responsibility to establish a society that enables positive environmental reinforcement. As
agents imbued with causal powers to alter our environments as well as our reactions to it, we
have no excuse to be moral bystanders. We are not entirely products. And even to the extent
that we are constructed, we still have the ability to change the things that construct us. This
world is relevant to who we are, in an extremely formative way, and this comes with an
obligation to build and maintain it in a way that positively influences the patterns of behavior,
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character and belief that enable healthy lives. We are self-reinforcing feedback loops within
ourselves and the natural and social worlds in which we participate which absolutely commands
a moral responsibility to ensure positive interactions with others in terms of justice, fairness, and
care. However, these theories are more effectively lent to the political realm, rather than science,
for science cannot objectively determine what is Good. Suffice to conclude here then with the
assertion that we are beings with some kind of essential existence, and determine what kind of
beings we are and what kind of world is most conducive to our spiritual, mental and physical
flourishing in the next sections.
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The Situated-Individual Self
This next method of conceiving the self tends to be more political in nature. The basic tenet
of the view of the situated self as I am advancing it rests on the assumption of a human agent that
possesses some quality on its own prior to integration into a social structure. However, in this
view, full self-hood is defined by participation within the structure and thus extends beyond the
boundaries of the individual as defined by the body, or mind, or even soul. Naturally then,
theories of this nature will be less concerned with the precise origin of agency, and identity, but
rather will focus on ways in which they are realized within social structures, the ways in which
they affect those structures, and how the effects are reciprocated upon the selves contained
therein. In spite of these similarities there are numerous ways one can conceive a self in
conversation with a structured society, and each comes with its own assumptions and
conclusions. For the most part, these assumptions will deal with what type of antecedent subject
exists, how society affects the individuals that comprise it, and what is good for those individuals
involved, as well as general society. The following will be an examination of how self-hood,
understood primarily as agential identity, is defined and cultivated by different conceptions of
good social structures, based on their various goals and effects. Agency, authenticity and
meaningfulness are all relevant considerations of full selfhood. The primary focus will be over
liberal individualist and communitarian perspectives on selfhood, often implied by the types of
societies they hold as best.
Briefly, a quick aside is necessary to address those who might assert that society can be
considered simply a collection of self-actualized individuals interacting mostly out of necessity.
Even from the most liberal perspective which would posit an entirely antecedently individuated
subject, this self is most fully realized within the boundaries of a kind of community, defined
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most loosely as society in general. Liberalism holds most important the ability of an individual
to freely choose and pursue his or her conception of the good, in terms of ends and values.
While self is defined primarily through differentiation, this differentiation must be between
nominally similar entities. As such, if this antecedently individuated subject, imbued with full
capacity for rational choice, existed in a situation fully devoid of any human contact yet with
sufficient leisure to consider its own goods, this capacity for free choice would be wholly
negated. For choice is only relevant between two (or more) valid options. Thus if the only
options available to such a person were of his or her own invention, any rational capacity at all
would be meaningless. Even if we are to assume that this person has achieved the best possible
life, there would be no way for this person to reflectively affirm his or her own choices. Human
flourishing is determined by free choice, yet his person would be entirely contingent upon his or
her own solitude. The fullest humanity is defined, by liberal adherents, to be free, rational,
reflective affirmation of one’s own livelihood, which is impossible outside the boundaries of a
society because such an existence denies the possibility of the necessary comparison. A value
freely chosen is not valuable if there are no potential alternatives. To have values then, one must
be already within an environment that at the very least supports choice.
Liberal Individualist
Here now, we will venture further into this liberal perspective. Beginning at one extreme
with Immanuel Kant, one finds an assertion of a transcendental self as the fundamental unit of
interaction with the world, morality and the good. Kant envisioned a subject totally separated
from any contingent circumstances engaging in pure rationality with the Universal moral law. In
this way, one could know the right thing to do in a way that was not dependent on any prior fact,
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insuring an objective morality. 41 At first glance, this seems to indicate a totally free self that
exists prior to any connection to any other individual or circumstance that is capable of reason
and agential action. And while the existence of this subject is assumed to be true, it is not a self
in the fullness that the term requires. For just as morality based upon the Universal law would be
wholly irrelevant outside of its application in the real world, so would the rational agent be
incomplete without engaging in both transcendental reason and interaction with other
individuals. In fact, it is precisely that interaction that requires the application of a moral law in
the first place. For Kant, full realization of one’s identity as a moral actor only comes in the
midst of other individuals. However, the Kantian self is deeply unsatisfactory for a variety of
reasons, most notably that it separates the agent entirely from contingencies which, instead of
leading to total rationality, leads simply to arbitrariness.
In response, John Rawls advanced a theory of justice designed to be more empirically valid.
In his view, justice was the primary virtue of a good society, and it was best reached through
application of certain principles that would be agreed upon behind a “veil of ignorance.”42 In
such a situation, individuals would be blind, not to all contingencies as in Kant’s theory, but only
to those deemed morally irrelevant in order “to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it
seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice and therefore on these
principles themselves.”43 Ideally, they would not know anything particular (such as their
individual conceptions of the good) but would be fully aware of the need for primary goods,
these assumed to be universally human goods. From here justice could, in theory, be readily
achieved.
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This particular theory presumes a number of things about the self it requires. Primarily, it
presumes an agent capable of choice that exists prior to circumstance. As a deontological liberal
who favors equal liberty above all else, Rawls necessarily holds that what is right is superior to
what is good, because goods are contingent and right can be an absolute, as in the case of justice.
But such a conclusion further requires that a person exist prior to his or her ends, such that “what
is most important to our personhood is not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose
them.”44 Such a person is “always, irreducibly, an active, willing agent, distinguishable from
[one’s] surroundings and capable of choice.” 45
In addition to existing prior to ends, the self must be possessive. By this, one should
understand “the self as a subject of possession, for in possession the self is distanced from its
ends without being detached altogether.”46 These ends are objects of choice to which one relates
purely through acts of the will. In such a way, the agency of the self is affirmed as the grounding
for identity, insofar as ends are the chosen preferences of a prior self that exists as the possessor
of interests. The life of this self is authentic almost by reflexive definition, provided the choice
of ends is not coerced in some way. It is further authentic insofar as the goals and activities
chosen by this self relate to his or her conception of the good. Meaningfulness is a subject many
liberals shy away from, for it demands a standard of comparison that asserts a superiority that is
in conflict with their support of difference. Thus by this view, a life is considered meaningful
only internally, at most.
However, this leaves open the question of whether this type of self really, empirically exists,
is created by a liberal regime or is simply necessary for the regime to function as envisioned.
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This raises the further question of whether a self in this manner should be valued and if so,
whether it should be cultivated by the state.
Liberal regimes favor a self of capacities. By this I mean that, at bottom the subject is
understood to have capacity for choice and autonomy that is essential to the realization of a full
identity. Indeed, agency is presumed to exist prior to integration into a society. Digeser argues
that “agency itself implies that we already have some capacity to exercise practical reason. An
individual who was unable to relate means to ends would hardly qualify as an agent.”47 The
liberal self is thus defined as a chooser, with an identity further constituted by the ends he or she
chooses (which may or may not presuppose natural inclinations). But the liberal conception of
self, as its name would suggest, is not very strictly defined. What is important to the liberal
notion of personhood is liberty and the respect for difference.
Autonomy, for example, may be important to a particular individual, though it is not
necessary for a flourishing life. One can conceive a culture wherein goals are shared to the extent
that critical reflection is unnecessary, or frowned upon, that would still enable an agent to live a
perfectly content life. 48 This is no problem for liberal society, so long as the identity as
constituted by life within that particular community is not directly harmful and was freely
chosen. Authenticity meets a similar fate, in that liberalism declines to make a judgment
regarding a standard of authenticity. In fact, liberalism sees assertions of authenticity and
inauthenticity as inherently dangerous, as they threaten to marginalize those that fall outside of a
set category defined as ‘authentic.’
At the end of the day though, Digeser acknowledges that selfcraft is unavoidable within a
politically grounded society. “Paradoxically, all sides agree that whatever social and political

47
48

Peter Digeser, Our Politics, Our Selves? 198.
Ibid, 176.

34
practices we devise, some conception of the self will be perceived as advantaged or
disadvantaged.”49 For this and other reasons, Digeser argues for a “qualified permission” of the
state to engage in selfcraft. This is understood as not precluding talk of the self from entering
politics (socially realized as it is) but not making a requirement of it, as this runs the risk of either
marginalization or normalization.
In summary, the liberal individualist self is an antecedent agent capable of choice that is fully
realized within society through a variety of chosen goods and ends that may nonetheless stem
from natural attributions and/or desires/inclinations. Society is required because respect for
difference, a fundamental liberal principal, requires differences to exist, and a suitable platform
for differentiation to take place.
Classical Political Rationalist
A second political tradition that, while not large in the public mind, nonetheless deserves a
place in the discourse is defined by the category “classical political rationalist.” 50 These neoclassicists generally posit the soul as the given character of a human being; the essential essence
beyond choice. “The preference for soultalk harkens us back to the claim that nature may be
able to provide a standard for judging the character and quality of communal life.” 51 As such,
they adhere to a belief that there is a proper hierarchy of the drives of the soul, of values and of
society. Reason is given the privileged position at the top of this hierarchy, and all is properly
ordered when reason actually resides there. Inherent in this natural order is a capacity for human
excellence, understood in various ways, but most basically “an engagement in and a concern
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with politics” as well as a “capacity for noble actions” accorded with intellectual and moral
virtue.52
In short, the classical political rationalists see a definite conception of a person as an entity
imbued with agential capacity (though not to equal degrees53) that nonetheless has a natural
order. One’s life is authentic when lived in pursuit of the noble virtues. It is important to note
that the rationalists, like Plato, believed in an absolute truth of things, which is the goal of
contemplation. Similarly, a meaningful life is one that is engaged with politics, ruled by reason
and aimed at the achievement of noble action and virtue. In like fashion, the classical political
rationalists show disfavor to liberalism for a number of reasons. Primarily, they see it as
disordering. Reason is no longer accorded the supreme place they believe it deserves because
other passions have been allowed to become too relevant. Additionally, the emphasis on equality
that is so favored by liberal democracy is seen as over-individualizing, which leads to resentment
and dis-involvement with political life. Thus, the classical political rationalists see the
cultivation of a particular type of self, the well-ordered and engaged citizen, as an absolute
obligation of the state. This assertion again shows that a self is very often believed to be, to at
least some degree, circumscribed by the society within which it exists.
Communist
At this point we will move on from these more individualistic conceptions of the situated self
and briefly look over what is perhaps the most famous conception of a self defined by
community ever advanced: Communism. The most fundamental way in which Communism
differentiates from the previous theories is in the assertion that a person is not, at base, an
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individual but a constituted being with individual qualities. Marx held that, above all else, a
human being was a producer, and it was through the manner of production that the self was
made. “This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which
every individual and generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what
the philosophers have conceived as ‘substance’ and ‘essence’ of man.” 54 Marx thus asserts that a
self is not antecedently individuated, but rather is antecedently situated, within a historical and
productive context.
It is this productive context that holds the greatest presence in Marx’s mind for, as he writes,
“By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material
life.”55 It is then the way in which humans are situated in relation to this production that further
defines selfhood, either as fully realized or, to use Marx’s term of art, alienated. Personal
identity was considered entirely constituted by and residing within the material realities of any
given human’s existence which are, of necessity, interactive. Thus, one’s personal identity,
insofar as it consists in individual activity, can be viewed either as a rationalization or a
justification of one’s position in relation to the material reality understood in the means of
production and division of labor. However, Marx necessarily would view this identity as a
falsehood, because a “communal interest does not exist merely in the imagination, as ‘the general
good,’ but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom
the labour is divided.”56 Therefore, the proper grounding for one’s identity is as a communal
being. This brief overview encapsulates agency within humanity’s productive capacity,
authenticity in a notion of a life lived in accordance with greater equality of ownership and labor,
this being an accurate reflection of true material conditions, and meaningfulness in the interests
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one pursues beyond one’s communal obligations. However, Marx acknowledges the difficulty
of transitioning to such a self understanding because it is embedded in a social reality that one
inherits.
Communitarian
This now brings us to our final consideration in the investigation of the situated individual,
which is communitarianism. The primary concern of communitarians regards what they see as
the necessary embeddedness of the self, within a historical context and a cultural framework that
orients one towards the good. These in turn supply the necessary horizon for the definition of
identity, the application of moral judgment and the standard for determining a life to be
meaningful.
According to Charles Taylor, a framework is the necessary background for the various
judgments one must make in regard to the life one is living (e.g. is it good, is it meaningful, is it
moral). He writes that in various modes of living “some framework stands unquestioned which
helps define the demands by which they judge their lives and measure, as it were, their fullness
or emptiness; the space of fame in the memory and song of the tribe, or the call of God,” etc. 57
These frameworks supply ideals of the “incomparable” forms of life to which one aspires when
one attempts to live a meaningful life. It assumes, by its very nature, that there is a higher good,
to which one is oriented in terms of the framework within which this good acquires meaning.
For example, Taylor writes about the framework of “ordinary life.” This holds as its
incomparable goods, among other things, the development of children, the solidarity of the
family and familial love. These are not transcendental universals in these terms, but rather are
given significance and meaning within the framework of ordinary life. From the perspective of
another framework, these goods may seem trivial.
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An important aspect of communitarian theory is the necessity of relationships within these
frameworks. The argument is that these relationships are, to a certain degree, inevitable,
unavoidable, and inescapable. Community in this regard supplies attributes that are not
possessed by, but constitutive of the self that resides therein. “To imagine a person incapable of
constitutive attachments…is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a
person wholly without character, without moral depth.”58 It is these connections that enable one
to justify one’s own desires and ends beyond mere arbitrariness that results of the unencumbered
self. 59
For some communitarians, one’s identity is intimately connected to judgments about a good
and meaningful life, which are the qualitative distinctions defined by the framework that exists in
relation to a moral stance towards the world. The framework is what allows one to declare
something worthwhile, good, worthy of respect, constitutive of our dignity, by providing a
standard orientation. The framework is what places one in a knowable orientation between
certain moral responses60 and one’s conception of the good. The self then, in part at least, exists
within this horizon wherein significance is attached to things. Thus the self, according to Taylor
is, in part an orientation to the good.
Additionally, this self is understood and made sense of through the use of language which
also serves to reflexively reinforce and define certain other parts of the self identity. This
constitutive language is only utilized and maintained “within a language community. And this
indicates another crucial feature of a self. One is a self only among other selves. A self can
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never be described without reference to those who surround it.” 61 This is especially important to
note if one is to consider the possibility of leaving a particular language community or
background. This is possible, though only if one aligns with another language community, or
else uses the original community as a starting point for innovation. In this way, we are never
free from what Taylor calls “webs of interlocution.” There is no way to be a self outside of a
defining community. Sandel makes a similar claim:
But we cannot regard ourselves as independent…without great cost to those
loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living
by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we
are – as members of this family or community or nation or people…Allegiances
such as these are more than values I happen to have or aims I ‘espouse at any
given time’…They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even
permits…in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments which taken
together partly define the person I am. 62
One’s self definition is influenced by the supplying of initial definitions for qualitative
distinctions by the primary language community. Basic things like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ acquire
meaning initially through one community, and are then understood similarly or differently later
on in relation to that initial definition. So then is the framework within which one finds one’s
identity via relation to the good constructed. It is important to remember that, as far as Taylor
and other communitarians are considered, these meanings are not creations, but articulations of
an experienced reality. They can never be made fully explicit, being dependant on language as
they are, but they are nonetheless truths. This assertion lends itself to the communitarian belief
that there can, and should be, standards that define what is good outside of an unencumbered
individual self and its preferences.
There is a final sense in which the communitarians see the self, which is the narrative sense.
A life, lived within a framework as it is, is directed in terms of an aspiration to fullness relative
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to the good of that life. It is a desire to attain a degree of perfection in relation to that good, and
this can be seen as a sort of quest. The narrative sense allows one to know, more or less
objectively, where one stands in relation to the goods of one’s life. But even beyond that, the
narrative encompasses the aspect of being that persons hold to be a defining aspect of their
humanity. If the good is a goal, then we are changing in relation to it, and the narrative allows
one to make sense of and acknowledge this change. The narrative sense of self gives one fixity
within the framework, without sacrificing unity. “But then what counts as a unit will be defined
by the scope of the concern by just what is in question. And what is in question is, generally and
characteristically, the shape of my life as a whole.”63 One’s whole life is thus unified through
the narrative sense.
One final thing that necessitates explication is the notion of the punctual and fractured self
that is espoused by communitarianism. This type of self can occur in a number of ways. First,
the self is truncated when the narrative sense is ignored. This is often called the “punctual” self
understanding and, in communitarian eyes, most notably Taylor’s, it separates from the temporal
and spiritual orientation that actually constitutes a self, and thus loses any meaning by falling
outside the realm of questions about the good, which can only be understood temporally. 64 The
self can be further fractured through unintegrated roles. These can be seen as facets of identity,
strands of the web, sides of the framework. When one considers them alone, one may feel that
one’s identity changes with circumstance. I spoke above of ordinary life as a framework. But
there are simpler frameworks, each with their own goods and values. One can identify as an
American, or Muslim, or a member of the Green Party. And there is no reason one person
cannot abide within all three. The problem arises when they are considered one by one, rather
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than concurrently. This compartmentalization leads, according to communitarian thinkers, to a
loss of wholeness in one’s life, or to a life with no sense of what is truly good.65 The solutions
can vary. Some, notably Alasdair MacIntyre, argue for immersion within a particular tradition
that can provide the necessary telos for a meaningful life. Others, such as Taylor, argue that we
must consider all components of our identities, including modern ones. 66 In this way,
acknowledging the historical, natural and/or theistic sources of our moral judgments, as well as
seeing ourselves as the locus of convergence of these various traditions, we can achieve a greater
unity and sense of wholeness and meaningful life.
It is worth noting in conclusion that these various conceptions are not very compatible.
Communitarianism faults liberalism for ignoring morally relevant contingencies concerning the
situation of a historical, narrative and conversationally defined self. Liberalism faults
communitarianism for its preference for “horizons of meaning,” stating that such an attitude
necessarily marginalizes those who do not fall within the horizon, thus making difference a
problem and tending to disjoint identity on its own terms. Classical political rationalism faults
liberalism for allegedly degrading the place of reason and encouraging a disordered view of the
soul. Liberalism finds fault with the rationalists on the grounds that they establish a particular
and exclusive standard of an authentic and “true” self that may marginalize others. Communism
rejects any tradition that creates a false relationship between humanity and the material reality,
be it a physical or spiritual justification. These modes of political thought are quite often
mutually exclusive in terms of how they define what constitutes a self most fully within their
particular spheres, and what they believe to be the best mode of life. While I will refrain from
making a definitive judgment on the efficacy and value of each of these various understandings, I

65
66

Digeser, Politics, Selves.
Ibid.

42
will assert that I hold the communitarian perspective to be a more accurate approximation of how
we really are as selves in the world. This perspective acknowledges the “always-already” aspect
of cultural embeddedness as formative to the self. Furthermore, communitarians argue (and I
agree) that engagement with the tradition within which one finds oneself is the surest way to
come to a fuller understanding of one’s identity and orientation to the world and the good and
thus take a greater agential part in one’s life and selfhood. However, simple acknowledgement
of, and engagement with, a particular tradition is insufficient, for it ignores the numerous, and
often hidden, contingencies of identity and life, which will be discussed at greater length in the
following section.
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The Contingent Self
Above, I discussed various ontological assumptions required by several political philosophies.
Each one presupposes a particular way of being at bottom, or else that there is a standard toward
which one can reach, if not both. One thing that is neglected by these traditions, however, is an
even greater degree of reflection upon the structures that inform these conceptions of selfhood
and the good. It is just such a manner of reflection that philosophical genealogists declare to
provide. By elucidating the historical contingencies of values and conceptions of identity, they
seek to problematize any declaration of grounded truth, and reveal the underlying constructions
that inform and shape values and identities today. As such, many deny the existence of a “true”
identity or an absolute good, instead choosing to engage in ironic participation in the activities of
formation, while maintaining conscious awareness of the relationship of power, resentment, and
contingency to the ways in which selves are understood and formed.
Construction
Let us begin with the world. The primary assumption is that the world is indifferent to human
beings. It is not predisposed to discovery, manipulation, or attunement by us. It simply exists,
and we exist within this world. As beings, we are constituted with various drives and desires. In
order to make sense of our place in the world, to interact with it well, to assign meaning and
value, and to understand how we are in the world, we require identity. Of course, our existence
is limited by our own finitude. Humanity is unified by the limiting power of mortality. One’s
temporal relation to death establishes necessary limits on the possibilities of life and results in
the necessary foreclosure of possibilities throughout life. In some ways, this relationship is a
resentful one, which will be important later on. For now, it is sufficient to note that death is the
primary contingency of life.
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Before moving any further, I must make one crucial, if subtle, distinction between ‘self’ and
“identity.” Because of the indifference of the world to human endeavors, identity is rendered
ambiguous, and thus cannot be entirely equated with the self. Rather, from this perspective, the
self exists in the space between existence and actualization. The self is realized (in part) through
identity. The indifference of the world means any constructed categories of identity will not
correspond directly with selfhood, thus leaving something uncaptured by articulation. Because
of this, the following will primarily use identity in discussions of selfhood because, while an
incomplete articulation of the self, it is the best possible approximation that the contingency
theorists will allow.
William Connolly identifies four types of contingencies that mediate identifying 67 traits: i)
physical and/or locational contingencies; ii) historical and relational contingencies; iii) the
contingency of relative cruciality to identity; and iv) the contingency of the strife between
“incipient formations/presentations of self and intersubjectively constituted modes of
identification.”68 In sum, one’s identity is contingent, by the understanding that the traits
considered constitutive of one’s identity (and therefore expressed selfhood) are subject to change
by virtue of the innumerable contingencies definable under the above categories, indicating that
even identity is not stable.
At any rate, this identity is initially and unreflectively viewed possessively; it is something
had by a subject, rather than something given, assigned, or constructed. It is seen as intrinsic,
and therefore natural. Furthermore, and insofar as this identity aligns with cultural standards, it
is seen as normal. Normality is an important concept for contingency theorists because many of
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them expressly deny it as a real thing.

Instead, normality is the result of a drive to naturalize

one particular identity as “right” or “true” that itself results from the unsettling presence of
difference. Difference is unsettling because it represents a threat to the self-certainty of one
particular identity. The drive to naturalize one’s own identity can cause one such identity “to
construe a range of differences as intrinsically evil, irrational, abnormal, mad, sick, primitive,
monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical – as other. It does so to secure itself as intrinsically good,
coherent, complete or rational,” 69 in short, to protect itself (and thereby, it’s self).
Now, this othering does not take place simply between individuals, but occurs quite
pervasively at the institutional level. As one type of identity becomes socially recognized as
normal, institutional policies and practices are initiated to enforce this conception:
health professions ferret out a conception of how the healthy body must appear
and act. Jurists and criminologists establish the standard of rationality. Liberal
theorists advance an autonomous, interest-driven individual with broad capacities
to choose and control his or her destiny. 70
The trouble is that these categories are established by knowledge that is not discovery, but
creation.71 These categories, as standards, create what Michel Foucault called “disciplinary
power.” This power forges identity through the establishment of restrictive norms, and
observation (both of oneself and by others) that can lead to disciplinary correction in the form of
either self-discipline as one attempts to change one’s own nature, and/or threat of
marginalization.
This final aspect, the threat of marginalization, of being othered, is particular harmful because
it imposes a broad category of abnormality upon a person who, for whatever reason, is unable to
align themselves with a standard that, at its core, is almost entirely arbitrary. Indeed, such
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practices often lead to the repression of difference. The irony is that difference is necessary for
the formation of identity. For example, the male-female duality is considered entirely natural by
most cultures. However, if one were to imagine (however far-fetched) a world comprised
entirely of biological men, then to distinguish oneself by sex would not only be senseless; it
would be impossible. Thus, sex would play no part in the constitution of identity and the
understanding of the self. The dictates of a standard only exist because of the existence of a
category they seek to alter, subjugate, or do away with entirely. Contingency theorists use this to
reject the notion of a transcendental ground for selfhood.
There is a particularly striking notion that results from the preceding analysis, and the
conclusion that institutional practices determine identity in large parts, and it is this: choice is
rendered all but meaningless in terms of identity if one is defined by existing categories and
one’s fit, or lack thereof. An individual’s choice instead will reside in conformity to the
culturally endorsed (and enforced) identity, or else resistance and discipline. While conformity
might be easier for some due to their identification with certain “entrenched contingencies,” 72
each option comes with its own set of resentments that compliment a host of resentments that
contingency theorists see in the interactions of modern life. I identify six distinct types.
The first type of resentment is prevalent even in those who find little divergence between the
normalized self and their own lived self. It is resentment stemming from benefits conferred by
alignment with standards. One feels one’s identity, not as chosen, but confirmed and validated
by the “disciplinary powers” and thus any benefits experienced because of this identity are felt to
be owed to the standards, rather than earned. One begins to resent the requirements of identity. 73
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The second type of resentment is more obvious. It is resent of feeling forced to conform to
standards with which one does not identify. One feels compelled by external and internal
discipline and observation to avoid being othered, and therefore cast out of acceptable society
and all its benefits.
The third type of resentment is that experienced by a subjugated subject. This is one who, for
whatever reason, does not conform to standards set down by society. Their self-expression is
thus deemed abnormal and in need of treatment or removal. Such individuals resent being
placed in a lower (or even entirely external) social position.
The fourth type of resentment is similar to the first. This resentment stems from an
observation that the capabilities of the state to achieve self-determined mastery and reach the
goal of a particular future have faded in the onset of increasing globalized contingency. Thus
restraints on identity seem more arbitrary than strongly linked to a particular future. Individuals
in this state resent being subjected to restrictions deemed necessities of a future in which they no
longer feel invested.74
The fifth type of resentment is rather an exacerbation of a type of resentment that already
exists inherently in the modern identity. According to Connolly, the modern identity is the result
of resentment towards existential suffering inherent in the human condition, combined with a
drive to establish a ground for meaning. This resentment results of one’s orientation to the fact
of one’s own mortality and a culturally defined need to establish responsibility for suffering.
The sixth type of resentment is somewhat related to the fifth and first types. This is a
resentment that arises from the realization that one’s values no longer correspond accurately to
the experienced reality. For example, one has a culturally informed value for self-responsibility
and the capacity for free, autonomous choice. However, it quickly becomes apparent that these
74
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values are presupposed by liberal democracy. Additionally, self-responsibility appears to stem
from the resentment of one’s own mortality. Seeking to establish linear meaning to their lives,
human beings establish a standard of self-responsibility as a critical part of their identity.
However, these and other values are not good of their own accord, but because they are seen as
efficacious for a desired end. But even the end is contingent on what is deemed good by the
prevailing standard of normality. If death is to be feared, then it engenders resentment. But if
death were to be approached nobly, a la Nietzsche, then that resentment would vanish and a
particular aspect of the formulation of the self might cease to be meaningful. Or it would remain
meaningful for different reasons.
In any case, these resentments indicate, to contingency theorists, that there is something
seriously wrong with the modern identity. These are taken as indications that the self is not
being properly expressed. There are a number of suggestions on how to alleviate this and
achieve better, fully, or more meaningful selfhood. First among these is the outright rejection of
any concept of the “natural” or “true” self/identity. Both Connolly and Foucault emphatically
resist this notion. Connolly writes, “If humans are not predesigned, and if they therefore are ill
suited to fit neatly into any particular social form, then any set of enabling commonalities is
likely to contain corollary injuries, cruelties, subjugations, concealments, and restrictions...” 75 In
a similar vein, Foucault argues that “[b]ecause we are not naturally suited to be one kind of
person or another, there is always something about us that resists the imposition of form.” 76
Furthermore, the imposition of form and establishment of standards of normality crate closure,
eliminating space for contesting differences that challenge the efficacy and surety of established
identities.
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This resistance returns us to the indifference of the world to our machinations. If the world
truly is not made to be understood by us, then it cannot be exhausted by any particular identity.
Furthermore, if this is so then the best thing to do is to affirm this inexhaustibility and begin to
recognize the contingency of our own identities. Both Connolly and Foucault argue for the
cultivation of care towards difference, acknowledging differing identities as valid interpretations
of the mysteries of an inexhaustible existence, and deserving of at least a voice in common
discourse. Connolly develops this into an ideal of “agonistic respect” wherein every difference
is not treated as lesser or other, but is engaged and appreciated, but approached with the same
irony and awareness of contingency with which one must approach one’s own identity. This is
so because identity is contingent, but inescapable. So the most one can do is acknowledge those
contingencies, avoid the urge to naturalize one or another form of identity as ideal. Thus, while
society may inadvertently cause harm to some formulations of identity, through agonistic
dialogue, those injured voices can be heard and rectification can be sought. In short, the best
selves are those that do not take themselves too seriously.
Performance
There is one other way in which the self can be understood from the perspective of
contingency, and that is as a form of performance. Judith Butler first advanced the notion of
performativity as it was exhibited in gender roles, asserting that such roles were not natural
aspects of the expressions of different sexes, but were more like scripts that were assigned to
particular individuals. 77 These scripts rose out of the desire for coherence in identity, but in
achieving such coherence, complexity was sacrificed. And complexity is one of the defining
characteristics of life, related in kind to the inexhaustibility of the world to a particular identity.
For Butler, then, one can reclaim some selfhood by performing the scripts parodically in order to
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problematize the assumed naturalness assigned to those roles and reveal the underlying
contingencies. One cannot escape this identity entirely, for contingency theorists and
genealogists like Butler, Foucault, and Connolly deny the existence of any sort of transcendent or
antecedently individuated subject that would be necessary for such a separation. Once again, the
best selves are those that subvert their own implicit claims to essentiality, recognizing that
articulation is only part of the whole self, and performance is only part of articulation and
realization.
Foucault offers another, though similar, way to construe the self as a performance of sorts.
However, his is more a literary project. Because he denies that a person can be both a
transcendental subject and an object of observation/knowledge, a person should not be
understood as both author and subject. He advocates a form of expression similar to “a certain
form of writing, which he called écriture, [which] is not about reference to a signified, but is a
play among signifiers.” 78 In this way, Foucault argued that life should not be about cultivating a
particular kind of self, but rather that one should engage in care for oneself throughout the course
of life so as to give form to one’s life and identity. His view of the self is concerned primarily
with expression, rather than Truth.
When all is said and done, these theorists do not contradict one another, for to do so would be
to declare an absolute, or to deny one identity as inferior. As Connolly puts it, the alienation and
resentment inherent in modern society resides in “wrong ways of living identity, not in the
absence of individual and common identities. It resides in the closure of identities in response to
the fragility of things more than in nihilism, anarchy, or relativism estranged from identity as
such."79 For these theorists and thinkers, the best solution to modern ills is the proliferation of
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identities and differences, of particularities and contingencies, rather than a narrowing of identity
in search for a transcendental truth. Now, while there are noteworthy facets to each of these
theories, and they certainly shed light on some hidden social ills, I do not think that the
conclusion here can be unqualifiedly endorsed. There are numerous reasons for this, which will
be elaborated further in the concluding section to follow. Suffice it for now to say that I believe
this goal of limitless proliferation and acceptance of difference would lead to a radical
particularization that would instill a nihilistic and profoundly disinterested worldview in subjects,
and actually serve to undermine the very goods it purports to provide, as in the revelation and
resolution of harm to individual selves.
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Conclusion
So far I have laid out a number of ontologies of selfhood, describing assumptions,
conclusions, and requirements of each particular theory. Up to this point, support offered for
particular viewpoints has been limited in the interest of space and concision. Now however, I
will expand earlier arguments to lend further credence to my initial conclusions, offer challenges
to opposing viewpoints and respond to challenges posed by those same theories. My hope is that
I will effectively consolidate aspects of various theories into one that is more unified and
effective in explaining what we are as selves, and how we can flourish as that type of self.
I will begin back at the beginning. A good number of the naturalist arguments, not the least
of which is that advanced by Owen Flanagan, expressly and explicitly argue against the
existence of a non-physical mind. I do not believe this to be a good argument, nor do I think it
should be considered as an argument on its own terms. Rather, this argument is best seen as a
reaction to the Cartesian dualism that is prevalent in lay belief today, and the theories that inform
that belief. Rather than arguing against the non-physical mind per se, this argument is rendered
against a particular formulation of such a mind.
However, the mind can very easily be non-physical. The mistake arises in thinking it to be a
non-physical entity. Instead, the mind is best understood as the expression of underlying systems
of the brain, body and environment. According to John Searle:
In the case of liquidity, solidity, and transparency, we have no difficulty at all in
supposing that the surface features are caused by the behaviour of elements at the
micro level, and at the same time we accept that the surface phenomena just are
features of the very systems in question. I think the clearest way of stating this
point is to say that the surface feature is both caused by and realised in the system
that is made up of the micro-elements.80
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This realization, however, is not reducible to the elements from which it arises. Take cold, for
example. Cold is a manifestation of the behaviors of air particles. It is measurable, and even
empirically observable. But cold in and of itself is not the object. You could not grab a handful
of cold. You could, in theory, grab a handful of air that expressed cold, but cold is both
inseparable from, and differentiated from the system within which it originates and is realized.
This analogy holds for the mind. It is not an entity of its own accord, but an aspect of human
existence.
In like fashion, we are able to return to the dual-aspect monist view, and the aspective account
of consciousness and the soul. It should be readily apparent how this understanding of
consciousness, as a subjective field of awareness, fits neatly within the concept of mind as
manifestation. This is important for two reasons. First, it allows us to cease viewing
consciousness as something possessed by our selves, and instead acknowledge it as an aspect of
human life. Secondly, it makes room for the soul. For the sake of argument, let us suppose the
existence of a divine. Let us further suppose that human beings can participate in this divine by
way of their subjective awareness. If the divine is then supposed to be eternal, then that part of
the person that contains the experience of the divine may very well be eternal as well. Now,
whether this is the entire self is another matter entirely, and depends on the nature of the divine
encountered. Nevertheless, this could be, and should be, considered an accurate portrait of the
soul. Now once again, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that there is no divine
whatsoever. In this case, nothing need change in terms of our understanding of consciousness
and selfhood. For if selfhood is defined at this level by the awareness of experience related to
one’s own body over time, and with intentionality, then Occam’s razor is satisfied, for our
account of human nature no longer requires the existence of a divine, unextended, simple
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substance embedded within our bodies that somehow communicates with the rest of our being.
The ontological assumptions are reduced to those that fit more with the reality of the person, and
thus the reality of the emergent self.
As mentioned above, the self is in part defined by the content of its consciousness. This is
what John Searle calls “semantic content.” It goes beyond intentionality insofar as it ascribes
meaning to the object of its awareness. For example, if I were to go to your house, knock on
your door, pull out a gun, and point it at you, a number of things would happen. Your kidneys
would release noradrenaline into your bloodstream, your heartbeat and breath would quicken,
your pupils would dilate, and your muscles would tense. But why? There is nothing intrinsic
about a gun that should cause that reaction. Objectively, it is just a hunk of metal with a
particular shape. An ape which had never seen a gun before would likely exhibit no fear
response at all. Rather, it is the meaning that your mind gives the object of experience and
observation, the semantic content related to the input (“Guns are dangerous”) that causes the
reaction. This is exactly in line with Glannon’s assertion that our conscious and unconscious
beliefs influence our physiological and psychological reaction to the world. It is these types of
feedback loops that allow a human self to be, against the Foucauldian claim, both a
transcendental subject and an object of observation. Transcendental in that the subject (the field
of awareness) is not what it contains, but also an object in that one can look at one’s own
reactions and see whether the align with considerations of propriety and character, established by
the coherent narrative sense of self.
So far we have established that the self is, at bottom, a manifestation of physical systems,
possessed of conscious awareness, and the ability to form intentions and attach semantic
meaning to experience. Further, it has been established that actions of consciousness can alter
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the system within which the self is situated. This self establishes narrative unity through
autobiographical attachment to past experiences and extrapolation out to future events. This
allows the establishment of a continuity of character that the self can then reference as it plans to
act in the future, or examines present behavior. This is part of what Flanagan referred to as the
“fringe” of consciousness. In short, the self can best be understood at this level as a sort of
indexical participant in the story of one’s own existence. It is the site (though perhaps not
source) of meaning, possibility, and action.
However, this meaning cannot be acquired in a vacuum. As I declared above, the self needs a
social structure to be fully realized. Even the antecedently individuated subject favored by
Rawls, endowed with capacity for autonomous choice and freedom to realize oneself, requires
certain assumptions. For these things cannot be valuable on their own; they require context. If
we ask why these capacities are to be preserved and valued, the standard must arise from
somewhere outside the subject; transcendent existence justifies nothing. Freedom is valuable
because it is God-given, it is fundamentally human, or what have you, but each and every
justification requires placement within a larger set of structures. It requires a framework.
This is where the acknowledgements of the communitarians come to the fore. They realize
this necessity and, rather than attempting to create distance from these frameworks in the hopes
of achieving a more transcendent good, they seek to engage more fully with them so as to
achieve a more real good. Rather than simply accepting the values one presumes in oneself, by
examining the cultural, historical, and social context that informs these values, one is able to
plumb the depths of those values most fully. The self is informed by them still, but the
awareness of their origins, whether in humanity, nature, God, or any other “moral source”
reorients one to the intrinsic goods therein.
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This, I believe, is the best way to combat the resentment and fragmentation felt in the modern
identity today. Take, for example, the type of resentment elaborated above that results from a
discontinuity between value and reality. This discontinuity may not result from reality affecting
the expression of that value, but from a misunderstanding of the good intended to arise from the
value, and the deeper reason of the value, beyond its own sake. For example, Taylor speaks on
the value of material productivity, like that prevalent in American society. The good has shifted
to productivity for its own sake, whereas Taylor argues that this was not the case initially.
Rather, productivity was valued because it indicated a good in one’s own character. 81 This shift
of focus between the goods results from a skewed framework, and a superficial examination of
culturally informed values. One must instead examine one’s place within the framework and see
the goods towards which the structure actually leads.
I cannot, however, go as far as Connolly and other contingency theorists suggest is necessary
for true flourishing. This inability originates in the fact that the assertions made are, at times,
mutually incompatible. These theorists assert that to deny a place to difference is to do harm.
However, any assertion of harm requires a standard by which this is to be measured, which is a
form of the normalization that they so explicitly reject. Of course, if mere non-acceptance of
difference is enough to qualify as harm, then this requires assuming that all difference deserves
to be respected and acknowledged as valid, which is an assumption I am not, at this time, willing
to make. Nor, do I think, would a great number of others, for the simple fact that it is easy to
think of an extreme example, like a child molester, who expresses a difference that nonetheless
no one would argue should be legitimized, or even politicized. But this establishes at one
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extreme, a limiting standard of what is acceptable. Thus categories form, perhaps out of
expressions of power, but it is a morally legitimate power.
But even beyond the extreme example, I find one more danger in the agonistic respect
advocated by Connolly. If we allow for radically particularized identity, as he seems to indicate,
and do not allow for the establishment of broader standards for judgment, even at the level of
whether a life is worthwhile, meaningful, or good, then we will find ourselves mired in a society
of individuals stricken with a profound mutual disinterest qualified as “respect.” Thus, even
standards of justice become impossible to apply.
Now, this is not to advocate for an outright rejection of difference in favor of one or another
arbitrary standard. I will not even make the lesser argument, like Alasdair MacIntyre, that there
is one particular tradition that is best suited to a good self. I simply believe that, since these
frameworks are inescapable and necessary to identity and selfhood, we ought to engage them as
fully as possible as members of one such community. Then, even if one seeks to disengage from
a tradition with which one does not identify, this disengagement is undertaken beyond the level
of the particular individual, and thus understood with support. For this reason, there is still a
need to recognize the contingencies of our identities, so that we are continually made aware of
the frameworks within which our selves are formed. Likewise, there should be a politically
protected space for the discourse of difference to take place, such as that advocated by Digeser.
Just as the mind is a feedback loop with body, brain, and environment, so the self is a feedback
loop between mind and society. Once this is known, we can begin to view ourselves, perhaps
not as authors of our lives, but at the very least, as editors.
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